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Some scholars view academic and industrial science as qualitatively different knowledge production
regimes. Others claim that the two sectors are increasingly similar. Large-scale empirical evidence
regarding similarities and differences, however, has been missing. Drawing on prior work on the
organizationof science, we first develop a framework to compare and contrast the two sectors along
fourkeydimensions:(1) the nature of research (e.g., basic versus applied); (2) organizational characteristics
(e.g., degreeof independence, pay); (3) researchers’ preferences (e.g., taste for independence); and
(4) the use ofalternative disclosure mechanisms (e.g., patenting and publishing). We then compare
the two sectorsempirically using detailed survey data from a representative sample of over 5,000 life
scientists andphysical scientists employed in a wide range of academic institutions and private firms.
Building onprior work that has emphasized different “research missions”, we also examine how the
Qature of researchis related to other characteristics of science within and across the two sectors.
Our results paint a complex picture of academic and industrial science. While we find significant industry-
academiadifferences with respect to all four dimensions, we also observe remarkable similarities. For
example,both academic institutions and private firms appear to allow their scientists to stay actively
involvedin the broader scientific community and provide them with considerable levels of independence
intheir jobs. Second, we find significant differences not just between industrial and academic science
but also within each of the two sectors as well as across fields. Finally, while the nature of research
is a significant predictor of other dimensions such as the use of patenting and publishing, it does not
fully explain the observed industry-academia differences in those dimensions. Overall, our results
suggest that stereotypical views of industrial and academic science may be misleading and that future
work may benefit from a richer and more nuanced description of the organization of science.
Henry Sauermann
Georgia Institute of Technology
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1  Introduction 
Scholars of science as well as the general public often consider industrial and academic 
science as two distinct knowledge production regimes designed to perform different types of 
research.  In particular, basic research, the domain of academia, is seen as best supported by a 
research organization that provides scientists with considerable freedom and emphasizes open 
disclosure in the form of publications (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Merton, 1973). Applied 
research, on the other hand, is seen as the domain of industrial science, where the research 
environment is more structured and results are kept secret or disclosed in the form of patents 
(Aghion, Dewatripont, & Stein, 2008; Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). Moreover, assuming that 
all scientists share a “taste for science”, it has been argued that industry must compensate applied 
scientists for a lack of freedom and the ability to publish by providing higher salaries than 
academia (cf. Aghion et al., 2008). 
Recent studies suggest, however, that this abstract view of academic and industrial 
science may be misleading and that the mapping from the nature of research to organizational 
setting and disclosure mechanisms is far from straightforward. For example, academic scientists 
increasingly pursue research characterized by direct applications, while some firms are said to 
pursue “open science” approaches (Ding, 2010; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Vallas & Kleinman, 
2008). There is also considerable evidence that scientists in industry publish and scientists in 
academia patent, and that the “same” piece of knowledge can be disclosed in different ways 
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Gans, Murray, & Stern, 2008; Hicks, 1995). The lines between 
academic science and industrial science may have become particularly blurred in the biomedical 
sciences (Murray, 2006; Vallas et al., 2008). 
While there is a growing recognition of the need for a nuanced view of industrial and 
academic science, our knowledge of the differences between the two sectors, as well as our 
understanding of the relationships between the nature of research and the organization of 
research within the two sectors lacks a firm empirical foundation. For example, data on the basic 
versus applied nature of research is often inferred from characteristics of patent and publication 
output (e.g., Ding, 2006; Thursby & Thursby, 2009b), which may confound the nature of 
research and the mechanisms used to disclose research results. Similarly, measures of 
nonpecuniary job attributes such as researchers’ freedom are typically not available. While wage 
differentials may be interpreted as reflecting differences in nonpecuniary job attributes this 3 
approach is unlikely to differentiate among different kinds of nonpecuniary job attributes and 
does not account for potential selection effects (Killingsworth, 1987; Roach & Sauermann, 2010; 
Rosen, 1986; Stern, 2004). 
In this paper, we use a unique data set to compare and contrast industrial and academic 
science along four key dimensions: the basic versus applied nature of research, organizational 
characteristics (e.g., freedom provided to researchers), scientists’ preferences, and the use of 
different disclosure mechanisms. Building on prior work that has emphasized different “research 
missions” of industry and academia, we also examine how the nature of research is related to 
other characteristics of science both across and within the two sectors. 
Our empirical analysis exploits detailed data for a nationally representative sample of 
over 5,000 PhD-level life and physical scientists. The strength of our data is that the same survey 
instrument was administered to researchers working in industry and academia, allowing us to 
make direct comparisons between the two sectors and across fields.  Among others, our data 
include a novel measure of the basic versus applied nature of research that is not conditioned by 
sector or by the disclosure strategy. The data also include measures of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job attributes as well as measures of scientists’ preferences. 
Our results paint a complex picture of academic and industrial science. On the one hand, 
we find significant differences between the two sectors with respect to the nature of research, the 
use of various disclosure mechanisms, organizational characteristics, and scientists’ preferences. 
Despite significant differences, however, we also find remarkable similarities. To wit, while 
industrial scientists appear to enjoy less independence than academic scientists, over 50% of 
industrial scientists indicate that they are “very satisfied” with their level of independence. 
Similarly, scientists in both sectors publish extensively, with 60% of scientists in industry having 
published in a 5-year span. Over the same period, 16% of academics have applied for a patent. 
Many of the differences between sectors are smaller in the life sciences than in the physical 
sciences, suggesting that scholars should remain cautious about generalizing insights based on 
data from the life sciences to other fields. Moreover, our analyses also point to important 
differences within each of the two sectors, indicating that the broad industry versus academia 
distinction may obscure important nuances. 
Consistent with the view that different “research missions” shape the organization of 
science in the two sectors, we find significant relationships between the basic versus applied 4 
nature of research on the one hand and the other three dimensions of science (organizational 
characteristics, scientists’ preferences, and disclosure mechanisms) on the other. However, 
differences in the nature of research between sectors do not fully explain differences in the 
organization of research, scientists’ preferences, or in the use of various disclosure mechanisms.  
Our work makes several contributions. First, a growing body of theoretical work 
examines the division of labor between industry and academia, often focusing on differences in 
researcher freedom, pay, and the basic versus applied nature of research (Aghion et al., 2008; 
Lacetera, 2009; Murray & O'Mahony, 2007a). We complement this work by providing unique 
data on these key constructs and by empirically examining the relationships between them. 
Second, our observation that differences in patenting are not explained by differences in the 
nature of research provides indirect evidence of the important role that other factors—such as 
organizational norms—play in shaping scientific disclosure in the two sectors (Bercovitz & 
Feldman, 2008; Cohen et al., 2000; Gans et al., 2008). At the same time, our finding of quite 
weak relationships between the nature of research and disclosure mechanisms suggests that 
future work should be cautious in using patent- or publication-based measures as proxies for the 
nature of the underlying research. Third, we provide rare direct evidence of differences in non-
pecuniary (independence) as well as pecuniary job attributes (pay) across sectors and 
organizations and find support for the notion that scientists make trade-offs between these factors 
(Aghion et al., 2008; Roach et al., 2010; Stern, 2004). Finally, our results may have important 
implications for managers and policy makers concerned with interactions between industrial and 
academic science and with the management of knowledge workers within each of the two 
sectors. 
Our research plan is as follows. In Section 2 we review prior work and develop a 
conceptual framework to compare industrial and academic science. In Section 3 we discuss our 
data and measures.  In section 4, we present descriptive data on similarities and differences 
between industrial and academic science (“industry-academia gaps”) and also examine 
differences in industry-academia gaps between the life sciences and the physical sciences. In 
section 5, we use regression analysis to examine the relationships between the nature of research 
and other characteristics of science and we also explore differences in key variables within each 
of the two sectors. A summary and discussion follow in Section 6. 5 
2  Background 
2.1  Academic Science 
According to the conventional view, the research mission of academia is the conduct of 
basic research, i.e., research resulting in fundamental insights. Knowledge resulting from basic 
research has characteristics of a public good and typically has little commercial value. As a 
consequence, financial incentives and a price-based market system fail to produce an efficient 
amount of such research (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959; Stephan, 1996). To address these 
particular characteristics of basic research, academic science has developed a distinct incentive 
system that encourages the production and sharing of research findings based on non-financial 
incentives such as peer recognition from the scientific community (Dasgupta et al., 1994; 
Merton, 1973; Stephan, 1996). Recognition can only be achieved by making one’s research 
publicly available, which makes active involvement in the scientific community and the rapid 
disclosure of research results via publications and presentations at conferences one of the 
defining characteristics of academic science. The timely and widespread disclosure of research 
results, in turn, fosters the accumulation of knowledge over time (Murray et al., 2007a; Sorenson 
& Fleming, 2004).  
The basic character of research in academia is also linked to distinct ways in which 
research is organized in universities. In particular, academic scientists enjoy high levels of 
freedom in choosing which problems to attack, how to approach them, and how to disclose their 
results. In recent theoretical work, Aghion et al. (2008) argued that scientists derive utility from 
this freedom itself, thus accepting lower wages in return. While high levels of independence 
allow researchers to pursue promising research questions, the low wage levels ensure that they 
do so at relatively low costs, making academia the ideal place for exploratory research.
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While this abstract characterization may be useful to parsimoniously describe key 
characteristics of the academic sector, it appears overly simplistic. First, American universities 
have always been engaged not only in basic research but also in applied work; in fact, some 
academic institutions were founded with an explicit charge to assist their regional economies 
through applied work (cf. Furman & MacGarvie, 2007; Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994; Stokes, 
                                                            
1 Stinchcombe (1994) provides fascinating evidence of a relationship between the nature of work and the freedom given to 
workers in a very different context. Applying an agency theory perspective, he found that slaves in the Carribean who were 
assigned tasks “that required the slave’s consent and enthusiasm as a trusted agent” (e.g., pearl fishers or mistresses) were given 
significantly more freedom than slaves working on tasks that did not (e.g., plantation workers). 6 
1997). Moreover, recent years have seen increasing patenting activities in academia (Henderson, 
Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998; Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 
2001), which some scholars fear may jeopardize the basic research mission and the open 
disclosure of research results (Murray & Stern, 2007b; Slaughter et al., 2004). One key challenge 
of empirical research on these issues is that micro-level measures of the basic versus applied 
nature of research tend to rely on patent or publication metrics and are thus contingent on the 
disclosure mechanism chosen. The link between disclosure mechanism and the nature of 
research may be weak, however, especially if research creates both fundamental insights and 
solutions to applied problems, i.e., if it lies in “Pasteur’s Quadrant” (Stephan & Levin, 1996; 
Stokes, 1997). 
The stereotypical view of academic science may also inaccurately reflect the 
organizational context in which academic scientists work. In particular, researchers in most fields 
rely extensively on funding from government agencies or from industry and these funding 
sources often pursue particular research agendas. Scientists seeking to obtain funding may have 
to adjust to these external constraints, which effectively limits their research freedom (Hackett, 
1990; Vallas et al., 2008). Similarly, funding agencies often consider researchers’ track record in 
a particular research area when making funding decisions, limiting scientists’ ability to change 
research trajectories. Thus, while academia offers high levels of independence in theory, a 
variety of constraints may limit that freedom in practice. 
Much of the discussion around academic science considers academia as a rather 
homogeneous sector, but we expect considerable heterogeneity within the academe. First, 
increasing patenting rates as well as other aspects of the “commercialization of science” have 
been studied primarily in the life sciences.  It is likely that the physical sciences show a 
somewhat different picture. Moreover, the academic sector is populated by different types of 
institutions, including not only top tier research institutions, but also lower tier institutions and 
medical schools with a potentially very different organization of research. Finally, there may be 
significant heterogeneity among individual scientists within a given institution because not all 
academics run their own lab. Staff scientists also make important contributions to academic 
science but are often supported on “soft money” and work for others, resulting in little freedom. 
This group of “unfaculty” scientists, to use a term of Hackett’s (1990), has grown considerably 
in recent years and  they “…populate an academic ‘never-never land’ made possible by the 7 
availability of research support but made miserable by the difficulty of obtaining such support 
and by their ambiguous status in the university” (pp. 252-253). Overall, it is likely that academic 
science comes in different shades and insights into this heterogeneity may significantly increase 
our understanding of the scientific enterprise. 
2.2  Industrial Science 
Industrial R&D has been studied extensively in prior decades (e.g., Miller, 1976; Pelz & 
Andrews, 1976; Ritti, 1968) and has received renewed interest in recent years. “Ideal type” 
industrial science, as portrayed by the earlier literatures and in some theoretical models, focuses 
on generating knowledge with direct commercial potential, i.e., applied research and 
development. In order to appropriate the financial returns to that knowledge, firms rely on 
secrecy and patenting and discourage researchers from publishing. Firms use a hierarchical 
research organization with little freedom for individual researchers. The scientists employed in 
industry, however, are thought to be heavily influenced by their academic training, resulting in a 
strong need for autonomy as well as the desire to publish and to develop a reputation in the larger 
field (Gouldner, 1957; Kornhauser, 1962; Miller, 1976; Stern, 2004). As a result, there is a 
mismatch between the organization of research in industry and the preferences of industrial 
scientists, which should result in compensating differentials in the form of higher wages. These 
higher wages, in turn, give academia an advantage in (labor intensive) basic research and 
reinforce industry’s focus on more profitable applied research (Aghion et al., 2008). 
While firms clearly focus on applied work that promises financial returns, some firms 
also devote resources to basic research because such research may increase their ability to absorb 
external knowledge or may result in longer-term financial payoffs (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Rosenberg, 1990). Moreover, some firms have shifted towards a more “academic” approach by 
allowing scientists to publish and by encouraging scientists’ participation in the broader science 
community.  This is especially the case in the life sciences (Cockburn et al., 1998; Henderson, 
1994; Hicks, 1995; Rhoten & Powell, 2007; Stern, 2004; Vallas et al., 2008). Case evidence also 
suggests that PhD-trained life scientists working in industry have considerable freedom in 
choosing concrete lines of research (Copeland, 2007; Vallas et al., 2008) and some companies 
offer their R&D employees official or unofficial bootleg time to work on projects of their own 
choosing (Augsdorfer, 2008). 8 
Again, there may be significant heterogeneity within the industrial sector. In particular, 
many startup firms have academic roots (i.e., they were founded by academics or graduate 
students) and may therefore provide scientists with more freedom and publishing opportunities 
than established firms (Ding, 2010; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; 
Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 2002). Startups may also benefit more than other firms from 
disclosing research in the form of patents and papers because such disclosures serve as valuable 
signals to outside stake holders (cf. Hsu & Ziedonis, 2007). 
While prior work suggests that industrial science may be more “academic” than reflected 
in the stereotypical view, individual researchers in industry may be less “academic” than 
commonly thought. Roach and Sauermann (2010) surveyed graduate students regarding their 
preferences and career choices and found that students who planned to pursue a research career 
in industry reported significantly lower preferences for independence and publishing than did 
those  preferring to stay in academia. Similarly, earlier work raises the notion of 
“accommodation” whereby industrial scientists are socialized to become less academic and more 
commercially oriented over time (Allen & Katz, 1992; Kornhauser, 1962). Such differences in 
scientists’ preferences across sectors are particularly interesting because they imply that the wage 
premium necessary to compensate industrial scientists for restrictions on basic research, 
publishing, or freedom may be lower than if all scientists shared the same preferences (Aghion et 
al., 2008; Rosen, 1986; Sauermann & Roach, 2010a). 
2.3  Framework for Comparing Academic and Industrial Science 
The abstract stereotypes of academic and industrial science paint a stark contrast between 
the two sectors. A more nuanced view suggests several similarities and perhaps even a further 
“convergence” over time. Before we examine similarities and differences between industrial and 
academic science empirically, it is useful to consider in more detail possible dimensions for such 
a comparison as well as the relationships between these dimensions. 
Drawing on our review of prior work, we can distill four dimensions that capture the key 
features of science while also highlighting important conceptual differences. The first dimension 
is the nature of the research being done, in particular, whether research is basic or applied 
(Aghion et al., 2008; Rosenberg, 1990). We expect that academic scientists are more heavily 
engaged in basic research than their colleagues in industry, who tend to work on applied 
questions. A second dimension are organizational characteristics, including factors such as the 9 
degree of freedom afforded to researchers and financial compensation provided (Aghion et al., 
2008; Dasgupta et al., 1994; Merton, 1973). As discussed earlier, a common argument is that 
academia and industry have developed different organizational and institutional characteristics to 
best fulfill their basic versus applied research missions (Dasgupta et al., 1994; Merton, 1973; 
Stephan, 1996). Accordingly, we expect that industry offers higher wages and less freedom than 
academia. Moreover, such differences in organizational characteristics should be explained by 
differences in the nature of research.
2  
A third dimension relates to characteristics of the individual scientists, in particular how 
scientists vary in terms of preferences for certain job characteristics such as research 
independence or money, or more generally in terms of a “taste for science” (Aghion et al., 2008; 
Allen et al., 1992; Sauermann, Roach, & Zhang, 2010b; Stern, 2004). We expect systematic 
differences in scientists’ preferences between sectors because scientists with heterogeneous 
preferences likely self-select into the sector which they expect to best satisfy these preferences 
(Roach et al., 2010; Rosen, 1986).  Moreover, differences in scientists’ preferences may be 
reinforced by socialization processes, i.e., when individuals who enter a particular employment 
sector change their preferences in response to the actual characteristics of their employing 
organizations (Allen et al., 1992; Gundry, 1993; Harrison & Carroll, 1991). Because of both 
selection and socialization, we expect industrial scientists to have weaker preferences for 
independence and stronger preferences for money than academics. 
The final dimension of our framework relates to the mechanisms by which research 
results are disclosed and protected, including formal mechanisms such as patenting and 
publishing as well as more informal avenues such as personal interactions at conferences and in 
professional associations (Gans et al., 2008; Merton, 1973; Murray et al., 2007a; Sorenson et al., 
2004). It is likely that differences in the nature of research across sectors are responsible for 
differences in the use of disclosure mechanisms, e.g., because knowledge resulting from basic 
research does not meet the criteria for patentability or because applied research loses much of its 
commercial value if openly disclosed in the form of publications (Merton, 1973; Stephan et al., 
1996). At the same time, even the “same” type of knowledge can be patented as well as 
published, and some research results are disclosed using both mechanisms (Ducor, 2000; Gans et 
                                                            
2 While we follow prior work in focusing on freedom and pay as key organizational characteristics, this dimension could be 
expanded to include other organizational factors such as the size of research teams, funding mechanisms, etc. 10 
al., 2008). Disclosure decisions may also be shaped by various objectives of individuals and 
institutions and by different functions of patents and publications such that the nature of research 
alone may not fully explain industry-academia differences in patenting and publishing (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Murray, 2006; Sauermann, Cohen, & Stephan, 2009). 
Figure 1 summarizes our framework for analysis, highlighting the central role of 
differences in the nature of research as a direct or indirect driver of differences in organizational 
characteristics, characteristics of scientists, and disclosure mechanisms. 
   
Figure 1: Framework to Compare Academic and Industrial Science 
 
 














3  Data and Measures 
3.1  Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on restricted-use data from the 2003 Scientists and 
Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT) provided by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF, 2003). The sampling population of the SESTAT surveys includes all individuals living in 
the United States in the reference week (week of October 1, 2003) who either have a degree in a 
        ACADEMIC SCIENCE         INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE 
Nature of Research 
  E.g., basic vs. applied 
Organizational Characteristics
  E.g., level of freedom, pay 
Disclosure Mechanisms 
  E.g., publishing, patenting, 
conferences 
Nature of Research 
  E.g., basic vs. applied 
Organizational Characteristics
  E.g., level of freedom, pay 
Scientists’ Characteristics 





  E.g., publishing, patenting, 
conferences 
Scientists’ Characteristics 
  E.g., desire for freedom, 
income11 
science or engineering (S&E) field or who are working in a science and engineering occupation 
and hold a degree in a non S&E field. The sample was drawn to be nationally representative and 
we use the sampling weights provided by NSF. Data were collected primarily via self-
administered mail survey, supplemented by online surveys and computer-assisted interviews. 
Response rates for the SESTAT surveys were well over 70%.
3  
For this study, we use only data on respondents who hold a PhD degree in a science field 
and who work in industry or academia; i.e., we exclude scientists working in government and 
non-profits. Included in the “industry” subsample are respondents whose employer is classified 
as a private-for-profit, non-educational entity.  Included in the “academia” group are respondents 
whose employer is classified as a 4-year college or university or as a medical school.  Given our 
interest in science, we restrict our sample to individuals who are research active, i.e., who report 
that basic research, applied research, or development is either their most important or second 
most important work activity (see below for details). We exclude postdoctoral fellows because 
postdoctoral positions are by design temporary and may be followed by employment in either 
industry or academia (Davis, 2005; Regets, 1998).   
Our sample includes 5,018 scientists; 1,831 (36%) are employed in industry and 3,187 
(64%) are employed in academia. Industrial employment spans a range of industries including 
scientific R&D services (42% of industrial scientists), pharma (15%), and chemicals (12%). The 
majority of industrial scientists work in large established firms (more than 5000 employees, older 
than 5 years; 52%), smaller numbers work in startups (fewer than 100 employees, younger than 6 
years; 8 %) and other firms (40%). 
Of the academics, 43% are employed in Carnegie I and II institutions, 28% in medical 
schools, and 29% in other academic institutions (e.g., doctorate granting, comprehensive, and 






3 Detailed information on the SESTAT data file is available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sestat/. 
4 Academics could be not on the tenure track either because the employing institution does not have a tenure system or because 
an existing tenure system does not apply to the individual’s particular position. A closer look at these cases shows that they are 
primarily employed in tier 1 academic institutions and the preponderance of non-tenure track individuals in our sample are likely 
working as staff scientists and research faculty. 12 
3.2  Measures 
Table 1 provides a summary of our key measures. 
Table 1: Measures 






Dummy variable indicating whether respondent works in industry 
(=1) or academia (=0). 
Field of occupation  Based on respondents’ own classification using occupational codes 
provided by the NSF, we split the sample into respondents working 
in the life sciences and in the physical or related sciences. We also 






Type of R&D 
BASIC, APPLIED, 
DEVELOPMENT 
The survey asked respondents to indicate which of a list of work 
activities were most important / second most important in terms of 
time spent. The survey instrument provided a list of work activities, 
including the following three R&D activities and their definitions: 
  “Basic research - study directed toward gaining scientific 
knowledge primarily for its own sake” 
  “Applied research - study directed toward gaining scientific 
knowledge to meet a recognized need” 
  “Development - using knowledge gained from research for the 
production of materials, devices” 
We coded three dummy variables indicating whether a particular 
activity was the most important R&D activity. 
Salary 
(SALARY) 
Respondents reported the amount of their basic annual salary 





The survey asked respondents to rate on a 4-point scale how 
satisfied they were at their current employer with salary and 
independence. We use these measures as proxies for organizational 
characteristics, where higher levels of satisfaction with a particular 
job attribute should reflect higher availability of that particular job 
attribute (see below for a discussion). Given the prevalence of high 
ratings, we dichotomized these measures such that 1 indicates “very 





Respondents used a 4-point scale to rate their preferences for salary 
and independence in response to the following question: “When 
thinking about a job, how important is each of the following factors 
to you . . .”. Since responses are clustered at the higher end of the 
                                                            
5 In the life sciences, these fields include agricultural and food sciences (5.9% of total), biomedical sciences (36.6%), biomedical 
engineering (1.2%), health sciences (7.3%), and other life sciences (0.7%). In the physical sciences, these fields include 
chemistry (16.7%), earth sciences (6.26%), mathematics (8.15%), physics (7.0%) and other physical sciences (0.6%). We also 
include a separate dummy for individuals who self-classified as “R&D management”. 13 
IMP_IND, IMP_SAL  scale (anchors “somewhat important” and “very important”), we 
dummy coded these measures such that 1 indicates “very important” 




Each respondent reported the number of U.S. patent applications in 
which he or she was named as an inventor over the last 5 years prior 
to the survey (USPAPP). We created a dummy variable coded as 1 if 
the respondent had at least one patent application in the 5-year 
period (USPAPP01). Our empirical analysis focuses on this 
indicator variable rather than patent counts because our main interest 
is in the question whether scientists are generally willing to disclose 
research findings in the form of patents and whether their employing 
organizations allow them to patent. Thus, we are less interested in 
the quantity or value of patent output than in its existence. Our 
patent measure should capture all patents applied for by academic 
scientists, whether or not these patents are assigned to universities, 
and is thus more comprehensive than patent measures based on data 
provided by university officials (cf. Thursby, Fuller, & Thursby, 
2009a). Note that NSF confidentiality restrictions prevent us from 




Each respondent reported the number of (co)authored articles that 
have been accepted for publication in a refereed professional journal 
over the last 5 years (PUBS). We focus our analysis on a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if the respondent had at least one publication in 
the 5-year period (PUBS01), indicating that an individual is willing 




Respondents indicated whether they had attended any professional 
society or association meetings or professional conferences in the 
past year (PROFMEET=1 if yes). While attendance at meetings 
does not necessarily mean that a scientist communicates with others 





Respondents indicated the number of professional societies or 
associations they currently belong to. We interpret this measure as 
relating to “disclosure mechanisms”. 
Control Variables   
Experience 
(YRS_GRAD) 
Time since obtaining highest degree, in years.  
Ability 
(PHD_NRC_SCORE) 
We matched each respondent’s PhD-granting institution and the 
PhD field to the National Research Council’s evaluation of PhD 
program quality (Goldberger, Flattau, & Maher, 1995), using the 
rating of “program effectiveness in educating research scholars and 
scientists”. The scale ranges from 0 (“not effective”) to 5 
(“extremely effective”). This measure formally captures the quality 
of graduate education, but may also reflect innate ability to the 
extent that high-ability individuals self-select or are selected into 14 





Respondents indicated how many people they supervised directly in 
their jobs. We interpret this (logged) measure as a proxy for 
managerial status and, for those scientists running their own labs, as 





The survey contains data on the age and size of the employer. We 
created three dummy variables indicating startups (smaller than 100 
employees, younger than 6 years), large established firms (larger 
than 5000 employees, older than 5 years), and all other firms. 
Applies only to industry sample. 





We distinguish academic institutions using the Carnegie 
classification provided by NSF: Carnegie 1 and 2 institutions, lower-
tier institutions (e.g, doctorate granting, liberal arts) and medical 





Dummy variables indicating whether an academic scientist was 
tenured, on tenure track but not tenured, or not on the tenure track. 
Applies only to academic sample. 
Race/Ethnicity 
(RACE) 
Dummies for white, Asian, and other. 
Gender (MALE)  MALE =1 if respondent is male 
U.S. citizen 
(USCITIZEN) 
USCITIZEN =1 if respondent is U.S. citizen 
 
3.3  Measurement Issues 
The measure of the nature of R&D is critical to our analysis and deserves further 
discussion. As described earlier, respondents indicated the type of work that occupied the most 
of their time in a typical work week, including basic research, applied research, and 
development. Each of the R&D related options was defined in the NSF instrument and the 
definitions were the same regardless of employment sector.  Among the few studies that have 
measured the nature of the work of individual researchers, a common approach is to classify 
research based on the publication outlet, on citation patterns, or on terms appearing in 
publications (e.g., Ding, 2006; Narin, Pinski, & Gee, 1976; Thursby et al., 2009b). While this 
approach has many benefits, the choice of disclosure mechanisms may be endogenous to the 
nature of R&D and bibliometric measures of the nature of R&D may provide only limited 
insights into the relationships between the nature of R&D and disclosure mechanisms. A key 
advantage of our measure is that it is not contingent on the disclosure mechanism or on 
disclosure per se. Moreover, our measure captures the nature of the work a researcher typically 15 
does, rather than the nature of only a particular piece of knowledge produced (e.g., a particular 
publication) and our measure captures both successful and unsuccessful research effort. At the 
same time, we cannot rule out that researchers in academia and industry apply the NSF 
definitions in slightly different ways, although it is difficult to sign any potential bias.
6 Despite 
its limitations, our measure provides a unique perspective and complements prior work based on 
other measures of the nature of research. 
While we have an objective measure of the salary offered by the employing organization, 
we rely on a satisfaction measure as a proxy for the level of independence offered. Our rationale 
is that a positive relationship between the actual level of an attribute and individuals’ satisfaction 
with that attribute has been widely documented in the literature, including in the R&D context 
(Cable & Edwards, 2004; Idson, 1990; Wood & LeBold, 1970). Because an individual’s 
satisfaction with independence may depend not only on the actual level of independence but also 
on the individual’s preference for independence we estimate satisfaction models with scientists’ 
preferences as a control.
 7 
A general concern with survey data is the possibility of social desirability bias (SDB). 
More specifically, the concern is that individuals might inflate ratings of preferences that they 
think are socially desirable and give artificially low scores to preferences that may seem less 
socially desirable (Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992). SDB that applies to both industrial and 
academic scientists should not affect our results regarding comparisons between the two groups. 
However, it is conceivable that SDB affects the two groups differently. In particular, academic 
scientists may think that they are expected to care more strongly about independence than 
industrial scientists, and the latter may think it is less problematic to state a strong preference for 
income, effectively inflating an industry-academia gap in preferences. Any descriptive data on 
preferences we present should be interpreted in light of the possibility of such a bias. More 
importantly, however, SDB should be less of a concern regarding measures of satisfaction, 
measures of the nature of R&D, and measures of disclosure mechanisms.  
                                                            
6 It is possible that academics draw on established stereotypes and have a bias towards classifying their work as basic while 
industrial scientists may be more likely to see the applied aspects of their work. In that case, our measure should overstate true 
differences in the nature of research. On the other hand, if academic research is generally basic while industrial research tends to 
be applied, a particular project may appear relatively basic to an industrial scientist while an academic would consider it 
relatively applied, which may result in a downward bias in the measured industry-academia gap in the nature of research. 
7Our salary measures provide additional support for the suggested relationships between actual job attributes, preferences for 
attributes, and satisfaction. Those scientists who are “very satisfied” with their salary earn an average of $111,050, while those 
who are not very satisfied earn an average of $78,515. In a regression context, salary has a large positive impact on the 
satisfaction with salary; moreover, the interaction between salary and the importance of salary is positive and significant. 16 
A final important concern is that relationships between variables may reflect common 
methods bias, i.e., that relationships between variables may be inflated if similar scales are used 
for dependent and independent variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003). In our context, 
the fact that academic and industrial scientists received the same survey instrument could also 
lead them to give similar answers, biasing estimated industry-academia gaps downwards. 
However, a closer examination of our measures suggests that common methods bias should be 
limited because the survey used a variety of different question formats, most of which are 
objective and quantitative.  
 
4  Descriptive Analysis of Industry-Academia Gaps 
4.1  Basic Sector Comparisons 
Table 2 compares the means of our key variables for industry and academia and 
computes the “industry-academia gap”. The table also shows significance levels for the industry-
academia gaps, based on regressions models most appropriate for a given dependent variable.
8  
First, we find that only 6% of industrial scientists report being engaged primarily in basic 
research, compared to 70% of academic scientists, resulting in an industry-academia gap of 64 
percentage points. On the other hand, 58% of industrial scientists are engaged in applied 
research, compared to 28% in academia. Development is the primary activity for 36% of 
industrial scientists, compared to 2% of academics. We examine differences across fields (life 
sciences versus physical sciences) below. 
With respect to organizational characteristics, we find a salary gap of approximately 
25,000 USD, which is consistent with a significantly higher satisfaction with salary reported by 
industrial scientists.
 On the other hand, academics report significantly higher satisfaction with the 
level of independence in their jobs: 78% of academics are “very satisfied” with their degree of 
independence compared to 51% of industrial scientists who are “very satisfied” with their 
independence. While the gap in satisfaction is significant, it is also remarkable that slightly more 
than half of all industrial scientists are very satisfied with independence; this contrasts with the 
common stereotype that industry provides very low levels of independence.
9   
                                                            
8 For example, we test differences in the nature of R&D by regressing the R&D type dummies on the INDUSTRY dummy using 
probit regression. 
9 While our results suggest that higher pay is a key advantage of employment in industry, there may be other characteristics that 
make industrial science attractive. In particular, Roach and Sauermann (2010) found that PhD students associated industrial R&D 
with higher levels of access to cutting-edge equipment and resources for research. 17 
Scientists’ preferences also vary across sectors.  Industrial scientists find money more 
important than academics; in contrast, 81% of academics rate independence as “very important”, 
while only 61% of industrial scientists do so. Whether these differences appear small or large 
depends on one’s priors; however they do suggest that not all scientists share the same 
preferences and that systematic  differences in scientists’ preferences may need to be considered 
in future work on industrial versus academic science. 
Finally, we also observe significant industry-academia gaps in disclosure mechanisms.  
50% of all industrial scientists have at least one patent application in a five-year span, with an 
average count of 2.9. In contrast, only 16% of academics report one patent application, with an 
average count of 0.5. The industry-academia gap in publishing has the opposite sign – 92% of 
academics have at least one publication in five years, with an average of 12 publications. This 
compares to 62% publishing scientists in industry, with an average of 3.5 publications. Again, 
while the gaps in publishing and patenting are significant and large, these numbers also show 
that both sectors employ both disclosure mechanisms.
10 
Disclosure and “openness” in a more general sense may also be reflected in conference 
attendance and interactions in professional associations. We find that 87% of academics have 
attended at least one professional meeting in the prior year, compared to 74% of industrial 
scientists. Similarly, we find an average of 3 memberships in professional societies among 
academics, compared to 1.9 among industrial scientists. These comparisons show industrial 
scientists to have a remarkable level of engagement in the broader scientific community, even if 
that engagement does not reach the levels observed among academics.
11  
4.2  Industry-Academia Gaps in the Life Sciences versus the Physical Sciences 
Our analysis thus far has focused on differences between industrial and academic science 
broadly. However, most of the prior work on “academic” features in industry and “commercial” 
aspects in academic science has been done in the life sciences.  Thus, it is important to examine 
whether industry-academia gaps are smaller in the life sciences than in the physical sciences. 
                                                            
10 In interpreting patent and publication counts, it has to be kept in mind that we focus on PhD trained scientists who are research 
active. Numbers of patents and publications are likely to be lower for non-PhDs (e.g., BS and MS degrees) or for individuals who 
are not research active (e.g., teaching faculty).  
11 We do not have data on the specific conferences and professional associations and we cannot tell to what extent scientists from 
the two sectors interact at conferences/in professional associations. However, many important professional associations such as 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) have large numbers of members from industry as well as academia, suggesting that professional associations as well as 
conferences (which are often organized by those organizations) may provide important venues for industry-academia 
interactions. 18 
Table 3 reports means and industry-academia gaps separately for the life sciences and the 
physical sciences. A first observation in table 3 is that industry-academia differences in the 
nature of research are significantly smaller in the life sciences. Figure 2 visualizes these gaps in 
the nature of research and also reveals that two sources contribute to the smaller gap in the life 
sciences: (1) academics in the life sciences are more likely to be engaged in applied work than 
their colleagues in the physical sciences and (2) life scientists in industry are more likely to be 
engaged in basic research than their colleagues in the physical sciences. These patterns are 
consistent with the notion that there is more of an overlap between basic and applied research in 
the life sciences than in the physical sciences (“Pasteur’s Quadrant”). 
 
Figure 2: Nature of R&D, by Sector and Field 
 
 
The industry-academia gaps with respect to organizational characteristics are, however, 
similar in the life sciences and the physical sciences. Specifically, we find no significant field 
difference in the salary premium reported by industrial scientists or in the relative advantage 
academia has in providing independence. Consistent with this result, we also do not observe 
differences in the industry-academia gap in scientists’ preferences.  
However, we observe smaller publishing and patenting gaps  in the life sciences than in 
the physical sciences. Figure 3 illustrates these patterns by showing the probability of patenting 
and publishing across fields and sectors.  We see that the industry-academia gap in patenting is 
smaller in the life sciences for two reasons: (1) life scientists in academia are more likely to 

























patent than physical scientists in industry.
12 The gap in publishing is smaller in the life sciences 
primarily because life scientists in industry are more likely to publish than physical scientists in 
industry (71% vs. 54%).  Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that industrial 
science is more “open” in the life sciences than in the physical sciences. But again, even physical 
scientists in industry show a remarkable level of publishing activity (as well as conference 
attendance, see table 3). 
 
Figure 3: Probability of Patenting and Publishing, by Sector and Field 
 
 
5   Relationships  between  Dimensions  of Science and Differences within 
Sectors 
We now use regression analysis to examine industry-academia differences in more depth. 
First, we examine the relationships between the nature of research on the one hand and 
organizational characteristics, scientists’ preferences, and disclosure mechanisms on the other. In 
so doing, we address the earlier conjecture that different “research missions” of academia and 
industry may explain differences in other dimensions. Second, we consider the possibility that 
there may be systematic differences within each sector, e.g., between academics of different 
tenure status within academia or between startups and established firms in industry. 
                                                            
12 Lower patenting rates in the life sciences might seem surprising given prior work showing that patents tend to be more 
effective in protecting intellectual assets in the life sciences than in the physical sciences. However, inventions in the life sciences 
tend to be less complex, likely resulting in fewer patents for a given invention. Moreover, firms in complex industries such as 
semiconductors and electronics (which tend to draw on the physical sciences) patent extensively for several strategic reasons, 






















5.1  Model Specifications 
We begin by regressing the focal dependent variable on the INDUSTRY dummy using 
the full sample. The coefficient on INDUSTRY reflects the mean difference in the dependent 
variable between the two sectors, i.e., the “industry-academia gap”.
13 For example,  
  Patentsi = f (α + βINDUSTRYi + εi) .       ( 1 )  
 
  Next, we additionally include the measures of the type of R&D: 
  Patentsi = f (α + βINDUSTRYi + γRANDi + εi),     (2) 
where RAND is a vector of dummies indicating the nature of research (BASIC, 
DEVELOPMENT; APPLIED is omitted). The coefficients on these dummies indicate 
differences in the dependent variable across types of R&D. Moreover, a reduction in the absolute 
magnitude of β suggests that differences in the nature of R&D (partially) explain the industry-
academia gap in the dependent variable. 
  Next, we estimate regression models separately by sector and field and include a range of 
additional sector-specific controls. For example, the regressions for the industry sub-sample 
include dummies indicating the firm type (e.g., startup and established firm), and the academia 
regressions include dummies indicating the type of academic institution as well as tenure status 
of the scientist (e.g., medical school or Carnegie I+II institution; tenure track vs. not on the 
tenure track). These regressions also include additional individual-level controls and detailed 
sub-field dummies. For example,  
  Patentsi = f (α + γRANDi + δCONTROLSi + εi),     (3) 
where CONTROLS is a vector of sector- and individual-specific controls. These split sample 
regressions provide additional insights into differences within sectors, providing a more nuanced 
view of industrial and academic science than the basic sector comparisons reported above. 
Finally, we use the coefficients from split-sample regressions to predict the likelihood 
that a given individual patents or publishes in industry and academia, respectively, holding the 
nature of research as well as control variables constant. This approach more accurately reflects 
industry-academia differences in disclosure mechanisms than equation (2) because it effectively 
allows independent variables to have different coefficients in the two sectors. Any remaining 
difference in predicted values would arguably reflect effects of other determinants of disclosure 
                                                            
13 Note that we are concerned with differences across sectors and not with any “causal” effects of sector on the dependent 
variables. 21 
mechanisms, e.g., different organizational norms regarding patenting and publishing or different 
functions of patents in the two sectors. 
5.2  Organizational Characteristics 
Table 4 shows the results using our two measures of organizational characteristic, salary 
and independence, as dependent variables. Model 1, which regresses log salary on the 
INDUSTRY dummy using OLS, shows a large and significant industry-academia gap in salary. 
The coefficient is reduced once we include BASIC and DEVELOPMENT in model 2 
(Chi2(1)=3.33, p=0.068), but it remains large and significant. We also find that individuals 
engaged in basic research earn somewhat less than those in applied research. Models 3 and 4 use 
only the industry sample. We find no significant pay differences between basic and applied 
researchers, although employees in development earn somewhat less. Consistent with prior work 
(e.g., Oi & Idson, 1999), we find that large established firms pay more than “other” firms that are 
not startups, that salary increases with experience, and that salary increases with management 
responsibilities. Using the academic sample only (models 5 and 6), we observe that academic 
scientists engaged in basic research earn significantly less than those primarily engaged in 
applied research once all controls are included. This finding suggests that compensating wage 
differentials may exist not only between industry and academia (Aghion et al., 2008) but also 
within academia.  
Models 7-15 examine differences in the level of independence and are of particular 
interest in light of the growing body of theoretical work surrounding independence in industry 
versus academia (e.g., Aghion et al., 2008; Lacetera, 2009). Model 7 shows a large and 
significant industry-academia gap; in model 8 we observe that scientists involved in basic 
research have somewhat more independence than those involved in applied research, and the 
composition of research explains a small but significant (Chi2(1)=4.09; p=0.043) part of the 
observed industry-academia gap. We find no significant differences in independence between 
basic and applied research for those working in industry (model 9). One potential interpretation 
is that, given the heterogeneity in firms’ activities (e.g., R&D, marketing, and production), 
different types of R&D are relatively similar from the firm’s perspective and are thus organized 
in similar ways. In contrast, we find some evidence that independence differs across types of 
research activities in academia, with somewhat higher levels for scientists in basic research and 22 
somewhat lower level for academics in development (model 11).
14 While this result may reflect 
that downstream work in academia is often tied to funding from industry or other agencies that 
may limit researcher independence, the differences across types of R&D virtually disappear once 
we control for a broader set of controls (model 12). Regarding other differences within academia, 
we find significantly higher levels of independence in tier I+II institutions than in lower-tier 
institutions. We also find much lower levels of independence for scientists who are not on the 
tenure track, likely reflecting that these individuals tend to work for other scientists and tend to 
have a lower status within the institution. Similarly, independence increases with the number of 
individuals an academic supervises, i.e., with the size of the researchers’ laboratory. Our results 
regarding independence hold when we additionally control for scientists preferences for 
independence to account for the possibility that a given level of (objective) independence results 
in higher levels of satisfaction (or utility) for those individuals who care strongly about having 
independence.
 15 
5.3  Scientists’ Preferences 
Table 5 reports regressions for scientists’ preferences, starting with the preference for 
salary. We find that industrial scientists care significantly more about salary than academics 
(model 1), which is to some extent explained by the fact that scientists engaged in basic research 
assign a lower importance to salary than those engaged in applied research or development 
(model 2). We find little heterogeneity in the salary preferences within the industry sample. 
However, among academics, those engaged in basic research and those trained at higher-rated 
PhD institutions tend to report somewhat weaker preferences for salary, while those at medical 
schools report somewhat stronger salary preferences. Somewhat surprisingly, academics engaged 
in development report significantly lower salary preferences.  The number of cases in this cell is 
very small, but assuming that scientists engaged in development have lucrative options in 
                                                            
14 Note that the number of academics primarily engaged primarily in development is quite small (n=56) and any results for that 
sub-sample should be interpreted with caution. 
15 The joint observation of higher salaries and lower independence in industry raises the question whether these gaps are causally 
connected, i.e., whether higher salaries are used to compensate industrial scientists for lower levels of independence (Aghion et 
al., 2008). In that case, we would expect a negative correlation between salary and independence also at the level of the 
individual. We examined these relationships but generally found either no or weak positive correlations between salary and 
independence. Moreover, in a regression context, differences in independence across sectors do not explain differences in salary. 
Our earlier findings regarding differences within sectors provide an explanation: certain scientists (e.g., tenure-track faculty and 
managers) tend to enjoy higher levels of both salary and independence, while others receive low levels of both factors. As 
pointed out by Stern (2004), compensating differentials should be studied for a given individual and (unobserved) heterogeneity 
limits the insights that can be gained from a cross-sectional analysis. Thus, while the aggregate industry-academia gaps are 
consistent with compensating differentials, different data are needed to clearly establish the existence and size of these 
differentials at the level of the individual (cf. Sauermann et al., 2010a; Stern, 2004). 23 
industry, this finding could reflect that only those with low preferences for money decide to work 
in academia. 
With respect to the desire for independence (models 7-12), we observe a large industry-
academia gap, consistent with the gap in levels of actual independence. However, we observe no 
significant difference in preferences among scientists involved in different kinds of R&D and the 
industry-academia gap changes relatively little once we control for the type of R&D.  
Overall, we find significant industry-academia differences with respect to individuals’ 
preferences, and these differences are broadly consistent with the differences in organizational 
characteristics. As discussed earlier, both selection effects (scientists with particular preferences 
self-select into sectors offering the desired organizational attributes) as well as socialization 
effects (organizations change employees’ preferences) may be responsible for these patterns. 
Unfortunately, our cross-sectional data do not allow us to disentangle selection and socialization 
mechanisms because we cannot separately identify cohort and aging effects (cf. Levin & 
Stephan, 1991). 
5.4  Disclosure Mechanisms 
It is often assumed that basic research is disclosed primarily in the form of publications, 
while applied research and development are disclosed in the form of patents (or kept secret). To 
the extent that this mapping between the nature of research and disclosure mechanisms holds, 
higher rates of publications in academia could be explained by the fact that academics are more 
likely to be engaged in basic research, while higher patenting rates in industry could be the result 
of a larger share of applied research and development being done in industry. Because our 
measure of the nature of research is independent of the disclosure mechanism, we are able to 
examine the validity of this assumption. 
Our analysis is reported in table 6. Models 1-6 focus on USPAPP01, indicating whether a 
scientist had at least one patent application in the prior 5 years. Models 7-12 examine PUBS01, 
indicating whether a scientist had at least one peer-reviewed publication. As discussed in the 
measurement section, we use indicators rather than counts because we are interested in scientists’ 
decision to become involved in patenting/publishing and in organizations’ policies towards these 
activities rather than a scientists’ productivity conditional upon engaging in a particular form of 
disclosure. 24 
Model 1 uses the pooled sample and shows a large industry-academia gap in patenting. 
When we include BASIC and DEVELOPMENT (model 2), we find that scientists engaged in 
development are less likely to patent than those in applied research. A potential explanation for 
the negative DEVELOPMENT coefficient is that results of development projects are less likely 
to be sufficiently novel to be patentable. We do not observe a difference in patenting between 
basic and applied research. Interestingly, the coefficient on INDUSTRY increases slightly once 
we include DEVELOPMENT, suggesting that once we control for the fact that industry does 
more development and development is less likely to be patented, the industry-academia gap in 
patenting is even larger than reflected in a simple mean comparison. 
Next, we estimate split regressions for academia and industry, separately for the life 
sciences and the physical sciences. The negative coefficient on DEVELOPMENT is stronger in 
the life sciences than in the physical sciences, particularly among industrial scientists. We find 
no significant differences between basic and applied research in the life sciences, which is 
consistent with the view that the two types of research overlap to a significant degree (“Pasteur’s 
Quadrant”). In the physical sciences, however, academics engaged in basic research are much 
less likely to patent than those engaged in applied work. 
We also see other interesting differences in patenting within sectors. In the life sciences, 
scientists in startups are significantly more likely to have a patent than those in established firms, 
perhaps reflecting that life sciences startups use patents as a signal of scientific capability and 
commercial potential (Hsu et al., 2007). Patenting among industrial scientists also increases with 
the ranking of the PhD granting institution, possibly reflecting an effect of ability on the quality 
of research.
16 In the academic life sciences, patenting rates are significantly lower in lower-tier 
institutions and significantly higher in medical schools, compared to Carnegie I/II institutions.  
Models 7-12 focus on the likelihood of publishing. We find no significant differences in 
publishing between basic and applied scientists, but scientists engaged in development are much 
less likely to publish. Once we control for the nature of research, the industry-academia gap in 
publishing decreases significantly; industrial scientists are less likely to publish partly because 
they are more often engaged in development work which is less likely to result in a publication. 
                                                            
16 Our interpretation of patent and publication counts as “disclosure mechanism” implicitly assumes that all individuals have 
generated research results that can be disclosed. While we know that all individuals in our sample are research active, we do not 
have an independent measure of their research productivity. Control variables for ability (PHD_NRC_SCORE) and experience 
(YRS_GRAD) should capture a significant share of the unobserved variation in underlying research productivity.  25 
Our split sample regressions show that the lower likelihood of publishing for scientists in 
development is driven primarily by scientists in industry. We also find that industrial scientists 
trained at highly ranked institutions are more likely to publish.  However, the likelihood of 
publishing decreases with time since graduation, i.e., younger industrial scientists are more likely 
to have a publication than older scientists. This result may reflect the fact that newly-minted 
scientists arrive with a stock of research findings ready for publication or a recent shift on the 
part of firms towards more open science by hiring more “academic” types of scientists. It could 
also reflect that scientists become less interested in publishing over time due to socialization.
17 
5.5  Publishing and Patenting by a “Standardized Individual” 
The regressions using the pooled sample showed that large industry-academia gaps in 
publishing and especially patenting remain even if we control for the nature of R&D. However, 
these regressions constrained the coefficients of the nature of work to be the same across sectors 
and fields and did not control for a range of individual-level variables such as gender or ability. 
We, therefore, estimated regressions separately by sector and field (similar to models 3-6 and 9-
12, but excluding sector-specific controls) and use the results of these to predict the probability 
that a “standardized individual” patents or publishes when working in industry versus academia. 
Using this method, we effectively predict the industry-academia gap for a given type of research 
and a given individual, allowing for different effects of the nature of R&D and of characteristics 
of the individual on the focal outcome across sectors and fields. This approach provides the best 
estimates of differences in the use of disclosure mechanisms that can be attributed to the sectors 
per se, rather than to differences in the nature of work or in scientists’ characteristics. For the 
most part, we use the median or mean values in our sample to define the “standardized 
individual.” In the life sciences, this “standardized individual” is a biomedical scientist who is 
engaged in applied research, graduated 10 years ago (HDTENURE=10) from an average PhD 
program (PHD_NRC_SCORE=3.45), supervises two other people, and is white, male and a U.S. 
citizen. In the physical sciences, the “standardized individual” is a physicist who otherwise has 
the same characteristics as the biomedical scientist. 
Figure 5 gives the predicted probabilities of patenting and publishing. We find large 
predicted industry-academia gaps in the probability of patenting for both the biomedical scientist 
                                                            
17 When we drop individuals who graduated within 5 years, the negative effect of time since graduation is reduced but remains 
significant, especially in the life sciences. 26 
and the physicist. However, the predicted industry-academia gaps in the probability of publishing 
are much smaller than those for patenting, and the publishing gap is insignificant for the 
biomedical scientist (0.88 vs. 0.94). The large remaining gaps in the probability of patenting 
even controlling for the nature of research likely reflect different norms regarding disclosure and 
different functions of patenting across sectors. For example, it is well known that firms use 
patents for purposes other than the protection of the focal invention, i.e., to build patent fences or 
to obtain bargaining power in cross-licensing negotiations (Cohen et al., 2000). Such uses are 
less relevant in academia. Moreover, such strategic uses are particularly important in industries 
such as semiconductors and electronics, which may explain why the remaining gap is larger in 
the physical sciences than in the life sciences. 
Our data do not allow us to clearly identify strategic disclosure, norms, or other 
mechanisms underlying the remaining industry-academia gaps in the use of disclosure 
mechanisms. However, by separating out differences associated with the nature of research and 
scientists’ characteristics, we provide estimates of the potential magnitude of these effects and 
our results suggest that such factors are more important with respect to patenting than with 
respect to publishing. 
 


























6  Summary and Discussion 
The stereotypical view of academic and industrial science depicts the two sectors as 
qualitatively different.  Recent evidence, however, suggests many similarities and, perhaps, 
increasing convergence. Unfortunately, a sound empirical basis to assess similarities and 
differences between the two sectors has been missing. Moreover, we have a limited 
understanding of the relationship between the nature of research, which is often seen as the key 
driver of sectoral differences, and other characteristics of industrial and academic science. 
Drawing on prior theoretical and empirical work on industrial and academic science, we 
develop a framework of comparison involving four key dimensions of science: the nature of 
work (e.g., basic versus applied), organizational characteristics (e.g., level of freedom), 
scientists’ characteristics (e.g., preference for freedom), and disclosure mechanisms (e.g., 
publishing and patenting). We then use detailed survey data from a representative sample of over 
5,000 life scientists and physical scientists working in industry and academia to compare the two 
sectors along the four dimensions.  We also examine differences within each sector and the 
relationships between the four dimensions of science. With respect to the latter, we are 
particularly interested in the extent to which differences in the nature of research explain 
differences in other characteristics of science. 
We find significant industry-academia differences with respect to all four dimensions.  
But we also find remarkable similarities. For example, while 78% of academics are very satisfied 
with their level of independence, more than 50% of industrial scientists are very satisfied as well. 
Similarly, over 60% of industrial scientists publish, compared to 92% in academia. Our data 
allow us to quantify differences and similarities such as these along all four dimensions, painting 
an unusually nuanced and representative picture of academic and industrial science. Moreover, 
our analyses also show important differences within each sector, e.g., between top tier versus 
lower tier academic institutions, between scientists with different tenure statuses, or between 
startups and large established firms.  
Our econometric analyses show several significant relationships between the nature of 
research and the other dimensions of science. However, differences in the nature of research do 
not fully explain differences in those other dimensions.  For example, a higher likelihood of 
patenting in industry is not explained by the fact that industrial research tends to be more 
downstream. 28 
 Our paper makes several contributions. First, although prior work has questioned 
simplistic views of industrial and academia science, empirical studies typically focus on a limited 
set of attributes (e.g., publishing) or on only one sector (e.g., either academia or industry). Here 
we compare industrial and academic science directly along four key dimensions using a large 
representative sample. Prior work suggests that our findings of significant differences and 
remarkable similarities have important implications. For example, Aghion et al. (2008) and 
Lacetera (2008) show theoretically that differences in the level of freedom granted to scientists in 
industry and academia directly affect important issues such as wages, the division of labor across 
sectors, or collaborative relationships between sectors. While our finding of higher levels of 
freedom in academia suggest that the mechanisms proposed by Aghion et al. and Lacetera may 
indeed be operating, our findings that the majority of industrial scientists are very satisfied with 
their level of freedom suggests that the difference in freedom may be less pronounced than their 
models assume. Overall, and returning to our title question, our results suggest that industrial and 
academic science may be better characterized as “siblings” rather than “twins” or “strangers”. 
However, neither of these simple labels may sufficiently describe the relationship between the 
two sectors since we find different industry-academia gaps across the four dimensions of science 
as well as a significant amount of heterogeneity even within each sector. 
Second, our results provide novel evidence regarding the relationships between the nature 
of R&D and the use of different disclosure mechanisms across the two sectors. In particular, we 
find that the significantly higher level of patenting activity in industry is not explained by the fact 
that industrial R&D is more downstream than academic research – indeed, the industry-academia 
gap in patenting slightly increases when we account for the nature of research because 
development work, which is more common in industry, is less likely to be associated with 
patenting than basic or applied research.  One interpretation of the remaining patenting gaps is 
that industry and academia are characterized by very different norms and incentives regarding 
patenting, or by different functions and uses of patents. On the other hand, we find that an 
individual working on the “same” type of research is almost as likely to have a publication in 
industry as in academia (though counts of publications remain much lower), suggesting that the 
two sectors are more similar with respect to the drivers of publishing.  
Third, our findings provide support for the notion that scientists make trade-offs between 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary job attributes (cf. Stern, 2004). We find that academics earn 29 
objectively less and are less satisfied with salary than their colleagues in industry but  they are 
more satisfied with their level of independence. While prior work has documented pay 
differences across sectors, we also document offsetting differences in nonpecuniary job 
attributes. However, our finding of weaker preferences for nonpecuniary factors in industry 
suggests that the observed salary premium in industry may be smaller than what would be 
necessary to induce a randomly selected scientist to work in industry (cf. Aghion et al., 2008; 
Rosen, 1986). Our descriptive results also inform research on scientific labor markets. Roach & 
Sauermann (2010) asked current PhD students about their perceptions of scientific careers in 
industry and academia and found that students perceived the sectors to be dramatically different 
with respect to factors such as independence, salaries, and publishing opportunities. Our results 
suggest that actual differences between industrial and academic science may be smaller than 
those expected by students, potentially leading to suboptimal career decisions. 
Fourth, our findings may have important implications for research on academia-industry 
interactions and technology transfer. One possible interpretation of our findings is that the 
significant differences across sectors could inhibit industry-academia interactions, e.g., if 
academic collaborators are more interested in working independently on challenging projects, 
while industrial collaborators are more interested in financial payoffs, or if academics get 
rewarded for publishing while industrial scientists get rewarded for patents. However, a different 
interpretation is that the remarkable similarities between sectors, e.g., regarding scientists’ 
preferences and publishing activities, may actually facilitate collaboration. Similarly, our finding 
of high levels of conference attendance and memberships in professional associations among 
industrial as well as academic scientists complements prior evidence suggesting that such 
“informal” knowledge channels may be important mechanisms for knowledge exchange within 
as well as across sectors (cf. Cockburn et al., 1998; Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). 
Finally, our work goes beyond qualitative comparisons and provides quantitative 
estimates of differences and similarities, opening up the possibility of using such quantities as 
independent variables in future work. For example, future studies could examine whether the 
“distance” between industrial and academic science explains important outcomes such as 
academic entrepreneurship or labor mobility. Moreover, longitudinal studies employing 
quantitative measures of the “industry-academia gap” could provide a more rigorous basis for 
assessing the “convergence” between the industrial and the academic sector over time. 30 
Our findings suggest several areas for future research. First, while we provide rich data 
on differences and similarities between sectors, we have made only limited progress in 
explaining the observed differences. Future work is needed to examine the underlying 
mechanisms, including institutional norms and incentives as drivers of differences in patenting 
and publishing. Second, longitudinal studies are needed on changes in the four dimensions. 
While changes in the four dimensions are interesting per se, longitudinal studies may also inform 
us about the relative importance of selection effects and socialization effects in driving observed 
industry-academia gaps in scientists’ preferences. Given universities’ increasing interest in 
commercialization and firms’ increasing interest in tapping into the benefits of open science, the 
question of how and how much individuals’ preferences can change to support those strategies is 
particularly relevant from a policy and management perspective. 
Our study is not without limitations. First, while our measure of the nature of R&D has 
several unique benefits, a more fine-grained measure that can explicitly identify research in 
“Pasteur’s Quadrant” would be desirable. Second, we had to rely on scientists’ satisfaction with 
independence as a proxy of actual independence. While satisfaction gaps were robust to the 
inclusion of various controls, it would be desirable to assess industry-academia gaps in 
organizational characteristics using more direct measures. Third, while our data allow us to 
compare and contrast academic and industrial research along a wide range of dimensions, they 
do not capture all potentially relevant attributes. For example, it would be interesting to compare 
the two sectors with respect to organizational characteristics such as the role of teams and access 
to resources for research or with respect to the impact and value of the knowledge generated. 
Finally, most of our measures were obtained from survey questionnaires and are self-reported by 
respondents; NSF confidentiality restrictions prevented us from matching our data to external 
data sources. While self-reports using the same survey instrument facilitate comparisons across a 
wide range of individuals and institutions, future work should also employ secondary data 
sources such as patent statistics. 
Despite these limitations, our study provides novel insights into the scientific enterprise 
and may also help decision makers in their efforts to improve research effectiveness in industry 
and academia and to foster productive relationships between the two sectors.  31 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Mean Comparisons Across Sectors 
 
Dimension Variable Variable Type Mean SD Mean SD Gap
Nature of R&D Basic research Dummy 0.06 0.23 0.70 0.46 ‐0.64 **
Applied Research Dummy 0.58 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.30 **
Development Dummy 0.36 0.48 0.02 0.13 0.35 **
Organizational Actual salary Continuous 106,081          53,248     81,326          42,179   24,755          **
characteristics Satisfaction salary Dummy 0.41 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.15 **
Satisfaction independence Dummy 0.51 0.50 0.78 0.42 ‐0.27 **
Preferences Importance of salary Dummy 0.47 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.10 **
Importance of independence Dummy 0.61 0.49 0.81 0.39 ‐0.20 **
Disclosure U.S. patent applications Count 2.91 6.82 0.51 2.58 2.41 **
mechanisms U.S. patent applications yes/no Dummy 0.50 0.50 0.16 0.36 0.34 **
Publications Count 3.49 6.09 12.00 13.89 ‐8.50 **
Publications yes/no Dummy 0.62 0.49 0.92 0.27 ‐0.30 **
Professional meetings attendance Dummy 0.74 0.44 0.87 0.33 ‐0.13 **
Professional societies memberships Count 1.90 1.68 3.09 2.23 ‐1.19 **
Controls Male Dummy 0.81 0.41 0.76 0.45 0.05 **
Years since graduation Count 15.03 9.12 17.18 10.35 ‐2.15 **
NRC PhD program ranking score Continuous 3.41 0.71 3.47 0.73 ‐0.06 **














Table 3: Means and Industry-University Gaps by Field of Occupation 
   
Industry Academia Industry Academia
N=848 N=1993 N=983 N=1194
Dimensions Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Type of R&D Basic research 0.08 0.66 ‐0.59 ** 0.04 0.77 ‐0.72 ** 0.14 **
Applied Research 0.60 0.32 0.28 ** 0.56 0.21 0.34 ** ‐0.06 *
Development 0.32 0.01 0.30 ** 0.40 0.02 0.38 ** ‐0.08 n.s.
Organizational Actual salary 107,052   84,063       22,989     ** 105,256   76,739       28,517     ** ‐5,527 n.s.
characteristics Satisfaction salary 0.42 0.27 0.15 ** 0.39 0.24 0.15 ** 0.00 n.s.
Satisfaction independence 0.52 0.79 ‐0.27 ** 0.51 0.76 ‐0.26 ** ‐0.01 n.s.
Preferences Importance of salary 0.49 0.39 0.10 ** 0.46 0.34 0.12 ** ‐0.02 n.s.
Importance of independence 0.63 0.82 ‐0.18 ** 0.59 0.79 ‐0.20 ** 0.02 n.s.
Disclosure U.S. patent applications 2.23 0.60 1.63 ** 3.50 0.35 3.14 ** ‐1.51 **
mechanisms U.S. patent applications yes/no 0.43 0.19 0.24 ** 0.55 0.11 0.45 ** ‐0.21 **
Publications 3.94 12.02 ‐8.08 ** 3.10 11.95 ‐8.85 ** 0.77 *
Publications yes/no 0.71 0.94 ‐0.23 ** 0.54 0.90 ‐0.36 ** 0.13 *
Professional meetings attendance 0.81 0.87 ‐0.06 ** 0.67 0.87 ‐0.19 ** 0.14 **





Table 4: Organizational Characteristics 
 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
ln_salary ln_salary ln_salary ln_salary ln_salary ln_salary sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind sat_ind
Industry 0.266** 0.233** ‐0.738** ‐0.663** ‐0.565**
[0.020] [0.026] [0.040] [0.055] [0.056]
Basic research ‐0.048* ‐0.089 0.005 ‐0.040 ‐0.070** 0.121* ‐0.050 ‐0.023 0.128* 0.092 0.109* 0.028 0.089
[0.024] [0.058] [0.058] [0.027] [0.025] [0.052] [0.134] [0.139] [0.058] [0.066] [0.053] [0.142] [0.067]
Development 0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.071* 0.041 0.053 0.004 0.038 0.003 ‐0.442* ‐0.426* 0.020 0.027 ‐0.401*
[0.033] [0.036] [0.034] [0.062] [0.051] [0.062] [0.065] [0.067] [0.190] [0.189] [0.063] [0.068] [0.182]
Imp. Independence 0.710** 0.604** 0.707**
[0.045] [0.065] [0.065]
Startup ‐0.043 0.181 0.147
[0.063] [0.123] [0.124]
Other firm ‐0.069* 0.121 0.136*
[0.033] [0.066] [0.067]
Lower tier ‐0.164** ‐0.205** ‐0.198**
[0.028] [0.072] [0.073]
Medical school 0.160** ‐0.014 0.006
[0.027] [0.075] [0.077]
Not tenure track ‐0.177** ‐0.469** ‐0.392**
[0.029] [0.083] [0.085]
Tenured 0.024 ‐0.126 ‐0.131
[0.028] [0.090] [0.092]
Field incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
PhD_NRC_Score 0.040 0.031* ‐0.006 0.029 ‐0.004 0.010
[0.024] [0.014] [0.045] [0.039] [0.045] [0.040]
Yrs since grad 0.022** 0.017** 0.000 0.006 ‐0.001 0.005
[0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Yrs grad _sq ‐0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln_Supdir 0.074** 0.111** 0.084* 0.107** 0.057 0.086*
[0.020] [0.012] [0.043] [0.035] [0.044] [0.035]
Male ‐0.001 0.089** ‐0.164* ‐0.073 ‐0.139 ‐0.050
[0.040] [0.027] [0.081] [0.064] [0.083] [0.065]
U.S. Citizen 0.011 0.024 ‐0.014 0.278** ‐0.010 0.300**
[0.062] [0.044] [0.113] [0.095] [0.115] [0.095]
Race incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Constant 11.165** 11.199** 11.438** 10.863** 11.193** 10.541** 0.766** 0.683** 0.018 0.294 0.686** 0.419* 0.145* ‐0.133 ‐0.004
[0.012] [0.021] [0.021] [0.118] [0.023] [0.088] [0.026] [0.045] [0.040] [0.249] [0.048] [0.200] [0.057] [0.260] [0.208]
Observations 5018 5018 1831 1831 3187 3187 5018 5018 1831 1831 3187 3187 5018 1831 3187
R‐squared 0.038 0.039 0.001 0.145 0.001 0.228
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Omitted categories are Applied Research, Large established firm, Carnegie I+II institution, Tenure track but not tenured
Full Sample Industry Academia Full sample Full sample Industry Academia Industry Academia37 
Table 5: Scientists’ Preferences 
 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
imp_sal imp_sal imp_sal imp_sal imp_sal imp_sal imp_ind imp_ind imp_ind imp_ind imp_ind imp_ind
Industry 0.259** 0.174** ‐0.592** ‐0.525**
[0.039] [0.053] [0.041] [0.058]
Basic research ‐0.126* ‐0.160 ‐0.187 ‐0.145** ‐0.105 0.076 ‐0.217 ‐0.206 0.123* 0.038
[0.049] [0.136] [0.137] [0.053] [0.060] [0.056] [0.135] [0.139] [0.061] [0.070]
Development 0.015 0.070 0.058 ‐0.565** ‐0.557** ‐0.052 ‐0.056 ‐0.095 ‐0.250 ‐0.196













Field incl. incl. incl. incl.
PhD_NRC_Score ‐0.034 ‐0.111** ‐0.013 0.092*
[0.044] [0.035] [0.045] [0.042]
Yrs since grad ‐0.009* 0.006 0.004 0.007
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Yrs grad _sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln_supdir 0.062 0.034 0.129** 0.117**
[0.043] [0.030] [0.044] [0.035]
Male 0.156 0.079 ‐0.146 ‐0.128
[0.081] [0.058] [0.083] [0.067]
U.S. Citizen ‐0.130 ‐0.190* ‐0.024 ‐0.031
[0.113] [0.093] [0.114] [0.106]
Race incl. incl. incl. incl.
Constant ‐0.325** ‐0.238** ‐0.082* ‐0.087 ‐0.215** ‐0.085 0.872** 0.821** 0.314** 0.596* 0.793** 0.3
[0.024] [0.042] [0.040] [0.248] [0.045] [0.186] [0.027] [0.048] [0.041] [0.257] [0.051] [0.217]
Observations 5018 5018 1831 1831 3187 3187 5018 5018 1831 1831 3187 3187
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Omitted categories are Applied Research, Large established firm, Carnegie I+II institution, Tenure track but not tenured
Full Sample Full Sample Industry Academia Industry Academia38 
Table 6: Patenting and Publishing 
 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
uspapp01 uspapp01 uspapp01 uspapp01 uspapp01 uspapp01 pubs01 pubs01 pubs01 pubs01 pubs01 pubs01
Industry 0.986** 1.017** ‐1.113** ‐0.845**
[0.042] [0.058] [0.047] [0.062]
Basic research ‐0.044 0.053 0.014 0.096 ‐0.527** 0.087 0.357 0.360 0.121 ‐0.012
[0.056] [0.186] [0.227] [0.091] [0.142] [0.064] [0.243] [0.238] [0.122] [0.142]
Development ‐0.173** ‐0.317** ‐0.131 ‐0.262 ‐0.144 ‐0.599** ‐0.422** ‐0.576** ‐0.497 ‐0.244
[0.062] [0.106] [0.094] [0.346] [0.367] [0.063] [0.107] [0.094] [0.296] [0.368]
Startup 0.468** 0.286 0.082 0.235
[0.163] [0.219] [0.194] [0.212]
Other firm 0.001 ‐0.162 ‐0.188 ‐0.110
[0.101] [0.094] [0.106] [0.095]
Lower tier ‐0.516** ‐0.552** ‐0.706** ‐0.695**
[0.121] [0.145] [0.124] [0.132]
Medical school 0.083 0.037 0.010 0.645
[0.084] [0.259] [0.127] [0.493]
Not tenure track 0.052 ‐0.261 ‐0.038 ‐0.540**
[0.108] [0.207] [0.151] [0.206]
Tenured ‐0.010 ‐0.301 0.118 ‐0.075
[0.116] [0.209] [0.160] [0.211]
Field incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
PhD_NRC_Score 0.278** 0.132* 0.039 ‐0.020 0.149 0.192** 0.072 0.167*
[0.074] [0.060] [0.058] [0.086] [0.077] [0.062] [0.067] [0.069]
Yrs since grad 0.006 0.003 0.014* 0.011 ‐0.040** ‐0.043** ‐0.016* ‐0.037**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.010]
Yrs grad _sq ‐0.002** ‐0.002** ‐0.001* ‐0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.000 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ln_supdir 0.308** 0.152* 0.320** 0.218** 0.160* 0.104 0.150* 0.281**
[0.071] [0.062] [0.045] [0.064] [0.073] [0.058] [0.061] [0.084]
Male 0.265* 0.272* 0.112 0.036 0.249* ‐0.121 0.078 0.142
[0.114] [0.128] [0.082] [0.168] [0.122] [0.136] [0.107] [0.148]
U.S. Citizen 0.123 ‐0.210 0.126 ‐0.256 ‐0.172 ‐0.292 0.108 0.178
[0.172] [0.166] [0.154] [0.207] [0.194] [0.173] [0.209] [0.198]
Race incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Constant ‐0.993** ‐0.959** ‐1.759** ‐0.093 ‐1.872** 0.312 1.413** 1.367** 0.01 0.401 1.356** 0.918
[0.028] [0.049] [0.352] [0.409] [0.282] [0.620] [0.034] [0.055] [0.362] [0.424] [0.314] [0.499]
Observations 5018 5018 848 983 1993 1194 5018 5018 848 983 1993 1186
Chi‐square 556.334 565.229 71.575 126.686 135.284 112.146 573.386 654.384 100.563 146.614 87.999 81.923
df 1 3 17 17 19 19 1 3 17 17 19 18
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Omitted categories are Applied Research, Large established firm, Carnegie I+II institution, Tenure track but not tenured
industry academia Full industry academia Full
life phys life phys life phys life phys